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Perhaps the most striking feature of business cycles is that their am-
plitude varies widely from era to era and from country to country.
Although there do seem to be striking regularities in the pattern of
covariation exhibited by variables connect.ed with the business cycle,
there are large changes in the magnitude of the cycle itself. These
differences in cyclical variation should properly be a subject of study
by economists. The existence ofthese differences suggests that "uni-
versal" models of business cycles-models that neglect institutional
determinants of business cycle behavior-·will not be adequate to ex-
plain the phenomenon of the business cycle.
This paper extends discussions by Burns (1960) and Baily (1978) of
the changing extent of cyclical variability in the American economy.
We seek to link this changing variability to changing institutional fac-
tors. In the process, we are led to a view ofthe role ofprice flexibility
in cyclical fluctuations that, while consistentwith Keynes's own views,
diverges sharply from the views characteristic both ofmodern Keynes-
ians and ofclassical macroeconomists of the new and old schools.
We begin by examining the extentofcyclical variability overdifferent
parts ofthe period 1893-1982. Usinga varietyofmeasures ofvariability
and several different statistical techniques, we find clear evidence that
the amplitude of cyclical fluctuations is much lower after World War
II than it was before. This result holds even if the Great Depression
is excluded from the pre-World War II sample period.
J. Bradford DeLong is a graduate student in the Department ofEconomics at Harvard
University. Lawrence H. Summers is professor of economics at Harvard University.
We wish to thank the National Science Foundation for financial support and Robert
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Thereis weakevidence thatoutputshocks have had morepersistence
in the post-World War II period than in the pre-World War II period.
This casts doubt on the hypothesis that the successful application of
discretionary stabilization policy is a significant cause of improved
macroeconomic performance since World War II. A number of struc-
tural explanations for this have been suggested, including the declining
role ofagriculture, the increasing role ofgovernment, and the declining
share of investment. Our examination of the data indicates that only
the increasing role ofgovernment can account for even a small part of
the decline in the cyclical variability ofoutput and employment that is
observed when we compare the pre- and post-World War II periods.
A clear distinction between the patterns ofpre-and post-World War
II data is the larger size ofaggregate demand shocks during the earlier
period. We attribute this to twofactors. First, thegrowth ofgovernment
between the two eras led to significant changes in the relationship
between disposable income and GNP. The existence of a large and
progressive tax system after World War II tended to mitigate cyclical
fluctuations in disposable income. This effect was accentuated by the
growth ofcountercyclical entitlement programs suchas unemployment
insurance. But large fluctuations in disposable income do not neces-
sarily have any consequences for the behavior ofaggregate demand if
all consumers can borrow and lend freely. Hence the importance of
the second major factor: a decline in the fraction of consumption ac-
counted for by liquidity-constrained households. Growth in the avail-
ability of consumer credit of various types led to a reduction in the
number ofconsumers who were forced to cut back their consumption
as a result oftransitory declines in disposable income. These two fac-
tors combined to substantially reduce the Keynesian multiplier! and
therefore to enhance stability.
Most of the major institutional changes in the economy during this
century have had the effect ofmaking the economy less "Walrasian."
Both the size of the government and the extent of government regu-
lations have increased markedly. Labor and product markets have be-
come more concentrated with the growth to significance ofunions and
conglomerates. The attachment between workers and firms was less
and wage flexibility was greater before World War II than it has been
since. In sum, the pre-World War II economy was much closer to the
perfectlycompetitive, atomistic idealofeconomictheorythanthepost-
World War II economy.
Conventional macroeconomic theory ofboth the Keynesian and the
classical varieties suggests that macroeconomic performance should
have been better in the pre-World War II economy because it was
1. Blanchard 1981 concludes that in America today there is essentially no multiplier.681 Cyclical Variability of Economic Activity in the United States
relatively free ofinstitutional rigidities and imperfections. Yet this was
not the case. We raise the possibility that the increasing institutional-
ization of the economy may have contributed to macroeconomic sta-
bility by preventing destabilizing deflations and by facilitating private
arrangements to smooth production and enlployment. This possibility,
noted by Keynes, has been largely ignored by both American Keynes-
ian andclassical macroeconomists.2 Themuchgreatercyclical variance
in real interest rates observed in the pre-World War II period is a piece
of evidence in favor of this alternative hypothesis. Further evidence
on the importance of this Keynes effect in explaining the changing
characterofthe business cycle is provided by an investigation ofvector
autoregression systems.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 12.1 profiles the changing
size of cyclical fluctuations over the period 1893-1982. Section 12.2
discusses the role ofstabilization policies in accounting for the decline
in output variability in the postwar period. Section 12.3 examines the
relation between the "Walrasian" characterofthe economy, price flex-
ibility, andoutputflexibility. Section 12.4 discusses a numberofsources
of evidence suggesting that the increasing institutionalization of the
economy may have contributed to economic stability. Section 12.5
offers a short restatement of our conclusions.
12.1 The Changing Cyclical Variability of Output
The sharp reduction in the size ofcyclical fluctuations in output and
employment between the pre- and post-World War II periods has been
noted many times. In his amazingly prescient 1959 presidential address
to the American Economic Association, Al1hur Burns noted that "its
[the business cycle's] impact on the lives and fortunes of individuals
has been substantially reduced in our generation. . .. There is no par-
allel for such a sequence of mild-or such a sequence of brief-con-
tractions, at least during the past hundred years in our own country."
Figures 12.1 and 12.2 plot the rate of change of annual GNP and the
percentage deviation of GNP from trend over the period 1893-1982.
They show clearly the declining variability of real output.
An indication of the magnitude of the decline in cyclical variability
is provided by a comparison of the peak-to-trough decline in output
between prewarand postwar recessions as defined by the NBER chro-
nology. During the postwar period, the median decline was 0.2%, and
the maximum decline was 1.8% during the 1973-75 recession. During
the period 1893-1940 the median decline was 3.8%, and the maximum
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Fig. 12.1 Annual percentage changes in real GNP.
decline was 37% between 1929 and 1933.3 Similar conclusions are ob-
tained using dataonemploymentorindustrialproduction. Forexample,
the median decline from peak to trough in industrial production was
12% during 1893-1940 compared with a maximum decline in industrial
production of9% during the postwar period.
A somewhat more systematic examinationofthe changing variability
ofGNP is presented in table 12.1. Three alternative measures ofvari-
ability are used. The first is the standard deviation of the growth rate
of quarterly GNP as estimated by Gordon (1982a). The second is the
standard deviation ofthe output gap as estimated using Gordon's nat-
ural GNP estimates. The third measure is the standard deviation ofthe
residuals when a continuous piecewise exponential trend is fit through
the GNP series. Estimates of volatility over a number of subperiods
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Fig. 12.2 Percentage deviation of real GNP from natural GNP.
Table 12.1 The Changing Cyclical Variability of Output
Period o1y <T~/Yn ~/Ytrend
1893-1915 .046 .061 .087
1893-1915/23-40 .044 .118 .138
1923-40 .041 .142 .160
1947-82 .011 .034 .046
1947-70 .011 .036 .037
1971-82 .011 .027 .051
Note: All calculations are based on GNP data described in Gordon 1982a.
aStandard deviation ofthe quarter-to-quarter change in the log of real GNP.
bStandard deviation ofthe difference between the log ofreal GNP and the log ofnatural
real GNP.
CStandard deviation of the difference between the log of real GNP and its piecewise
linear trend (breakpoints at 1915, 1922, 1940, 1946, and 1970).684 J. Bradford DeLong/Lawrence H. Summers
are presented. The periods 1915-18 and 1941-46 are omitted because
of the special effects of wars on economic activity. We also omit the
four-year aftermath of World War I because rapid inflation and sub-
sequent deflation make this period uncharacteristic of the remaining
American economic experience.
Regardless ofwhich volatility measure is used, the conclusion is that
output was more variable before World War II than after it. By all three
measures, outputvariability was about three times as greatin the earlier
period. Surprisingly, the much ballyhooed increase in economic tur-
bulence·during the 1970s barely shows up in the data. Apparently the
1970s were turbulent only in comparison with the remarkably placid
1960s. The data on the period 1893-1915 make it clear that the greater
volatility of output during the prewar period was not just a reflection
of the Great Depression. However, using either measure of volatility
in the level ofGNP, there is a noticeable increase in volatility between
the subperiods 1893-1915 and 1923-40. This is wholly a consequence
of the protracted downturn in output represented by the depression.
No increase in the standard deviation ofGNPchanges appears because
this measure places more weight on high-frequency fluctuations.
There remain the questions whether the declining variability in real
GNP documented in table 12.1 is statistically significant and whether
it reflects a decrease in the amount of statistical noise in the GNP
figures rather than a real change. Neither possibility seems very likely
to us.
It is not clear how one should go about determining the statistical
significance ofthe differences shown in table 12.1. Output movements
are serially correlated, and all tests ofsignificance require some explicit
model of the process generating output. We will simply note that if
successive observations are treated' as independent normal random
variables, then the hypothesis that the variance in output is constant
can be rejected at a level ofconfidence ofless than .1% for annual data
and .01% for quarterly data.
Itis certainly true that the GNPdata-particularlyfor 1893 to 1915-
are somewhat shaky. Gordon's quarterly data series is based on annual
estimates originally constructed by Kuznets and Kendrick. Kuznets,
at least, did not regard his data for the period before 1919 with confi-
dence. He sought to divert people into studying his estimates in the
form of five- or ten-year moving averages, and he was reluctant to
publish his annual estimates.4 It seems likely, however, that the defi-
ciencies in the data lead us to underestimate rather than overestimate
the extent of cyclical variation in the pre-World War I economy. The
original annual estimates assume that the relation between commodity
4. See the appendixes to Kuznets .1961.685 Cyclical Variability of Economic Activity in the United States
production and GNP before 1909 is the sarrle as the mean relation from
1919 to 1939. The estimates thus damp out independent variation in
services and transportation that is uncorrelated with commodity pro-
duction. Moreover, a recent reworking of the commodity production
figures that underlie these estimates suggests that the original annual
estimates give too high values to investment during the exceptionally
depressed 1890s and thus generateestimatesfor business cycle variance
that are too small.s On balance, we are led to conclude that the decline
in the size of economic fluctuations betwet~n the pre- and post-World
War II periods is a real phenomenon, one that economists should be
able to explain.
12.1.1 Accounting Explanations
One natural way to start an investigation of the declining volatility
ofGNPis to look separatelyatits different components. Perhaps output
has become more stable over time becaust~ the stable components of
GNP have grown relative to the unstable ones. In particular, govern-
ment-which is acyclic-has grown greatly in importance over the last
century. And agriculture, which is notoriously unstable, has shrunk
rapidly as a share of GNP.6 It has also bee:n suggested that the share
of durable goods in GNP has declined ov(~r time. Since the demand
for durable goods is volatile, this is also a potential explanation for the
decline in the volatility of GNP.
Table 12.2 presents some evidence on these issues. Itdoes notappear
that the changing composition of GNP can account for most of the
decline in the magnitude of output fluctuations. The percentage vari-
ability in year-to-year changes in our estimate ofprivate nonfarm GNP
declined by 56% between 1893-1940 and 1947-82 compared with 67%
for total GNP. The variance ofnonagricultural GNPis only slightly less
than the variance in total GNP, even in the period 1893-1915. This
somewhat surprising result occurs becaust~ the value of agricultural
products demanded is actually slightly less variable than all other com-
modity groups except for nonagricultural nondurables. The increased
decline in the relative variability of total G:NP is due primarily to the
rise of government purchases, which go from approximately 5% of
GNP in 1900 to approximately 15% of GNP today. Government pur-
chases exert a stabilizing influence in table 12.2 because the measure
ofvariability used (year-to-year changes) filters out the massive swings
in government expenditure in the post-World War II period associated
5. See the appendixes to Lewis 1978.
6. This idea is a relatively recent one. In the 1949 conference that was the ancestor
of this one, Kuznets referred to the neat coincidence ofthe simultaneous rise ofacyclic
services and decline ofacyclic agriculture. See Simon Kuznets, "Comment" on Joseph A.
Schumpeter, "Historical Approach to Business Cycles," in Anderson 1951.686 J. Bradford DeLonglLawrence H. Summers
Table 12.2 The Variance ofAlternative Output Measures
Period oiY1 cr~Y2 criY3 oiY4
1893-1915 .069 .076 .065 .070
1893-1915/23-40 .081 .093 .078 .088
1923-40 .098 .115 .094 .110






Source: General data from the national income and product accounts and from Kuznets
1961, Shaw 1947, and Goldsmith 1955.
aStandard deviation ofthe year-to-year change in the log ofreal GNP.
bStandard deviation ofthe year-to-yearchange in the log ofprivate GNP. For the period
before 1929 government transfers were assumed to be equal to zero and data on gov-
ernment expenditures were taken from Goldsmith 1955.
CStandard deviation ofthe year-to-yearchange in the log ofnonfarm GNP. Forthe period
before 1929 the proportion offarm output in GNP was assumed to be the same as the
proportion of agricultural commodity production in total commodity production plus
construction. Figures on commodity production were taken from Shaw 1947.
dStandard deviation of the year-to-year change in the log of private nonfarm GNP.
Constructedaccordingto (b) and (c) on the assumptionthat, before 1929, thegovernment
purchased no agricultural products.
eStandard deviation of the year-to-year change in the log ofconsumption. Before 1929,
"consumption" is defined according to Kuznets. Thus it includes some government
purchases, but fortunately these are small.
with military purchases that occur at longer than business cycle
frequencies.
The last column of table 12.2 shows that the standard deviation of
annual percentage changes in consumption has declined dramatically
from 5.5% in 1893-1940 to 1.8% in the postwar period. This devel-
opmentoccurred despite a substantialincrease-detailedin the Gordon
and Veitch paper in this volume (chap. 5)-in the share of consumer
durables in consumption between the two periods. This suggests that
the decreasing share of durable goods in GNP cannot account for a
large part of the decline in the variance in output fluctuations. More-
over, Gordon and Veitch show that ifconsumer durables are included,
then there has been no secular downward trend in the share of GNP
attributable to investment.
We have also examined a number of breakdowns of GNP by com-
ponent, including its industrial composition and the standard national
income accounting breakdown into consumption, investment, govern-
ment, and netexports. None ofthese exercisescontributed significantly
to explaining the declining volatility of output, and so they are not
detailed further here.
12.1.2 Financial Panics and Monetarist Explanations
Many economists have argued that a major cause of the superior
macroeconomic performance ofthe United States since World War II687 Cyclical Variability of Economic Activity in the United States
has been the smoother path followed by the money stock. According
to this line of thought, the Federal Reserve Board has done a good
(albeit not perfect) job in the postwar period. It has kept the money
stock from exhibiting the substantial year-to-year swings that charac-
terized earlier periods.
The problem with this line ofargument is that monetary aggregates
are in general endogenous variables. It is very hard to determine whether
movements in the money stock are causes or consequences ofmove-
ments in output. This is particularly true for the period of the gold
standard, during which the relation between the monetary base and
the money stock was very loose. Therefore~, in order to examine mon-
etary liquidity approaches to the business cycle, we concentrate our
analysis on a class of events-financial panics-that appear likely to
be exogenous with respect to output and that are associated with sub-
stantial declines in the money stock. We conclude below that, since
financial panics cannot account for a significant fraction ofoutput vari-
ance before World War I, although they do account for a significant
part of the variance in the money stock, fluctuations in monetary ag-
gregates are perhaps best viewed as consequences of output fluctua-
tions. Arguments (like the one above) that regard the smoothergrowth
ofaggregates as a cause ofreduced variability rely on weak empirical
support.
It is also important to study financial panics because a large body of
thought from Bagehot (1873) to Bernanke (1983) places stress on the
importance of a smoothly running financial system for good macro-
economic performance and on the serious real consequences of col-
lapses in the chain offinancial intermediation.
This line ofargument has typically run as follows: the financial sector
is unstable-subject to sudden sharp increases in the demand for li-
quidity-in the absence of a lender of last resort. Finance, it is sug-
gested, bears a strong resemblance to musical chairs; the last one to
the bank during a panic walks away empty-handed. Therefore a finan-
cial system that lacks a lender oflast resort 'will be prone to a collapse,
to a sudden reduction in the amount ofcredit available and a sudden
increase in the price ofwhatever credit is available.
When it occurs, this financial collapse has serious real consequences.
The division of labor, the successful functioning of specialized enter-
prises, depends upon the existence ofa credit system: agents must be
able to quickly and cheaply acquire the resources to enable them to
separate the time of purchase from the time of sale. In the aftermath
ofa panic there is a lower degree offinancial sophistication and there
are fewer possible paths of intermediation. This is, in some sense, a
reduction in the "natural" level of output. With the financial system
paralyzed as a result ofthe preceding panic~, production opportunities688 J. Bradford DeLong/Lawrence H. Summers
that would be profitable ifthere were a high level ofintermediation are
not profitable at the lower level ofintermediation prevailing.
This point of view is supported by Sprague's narrative history of
American financial crises (Sprague 1910, 58-61), where he recounts,
to give just one example, how the unwillingness of banks to extend
credit for trans-Atlantic shipments during the panic of 1873 threatened
the "cessation of commodity exports" and how the news of this fi-
nancial stringency in New York "partially paralyzed" the movement
of crops in the Midwest. This point of view is also supported by Ber-
nanke (1983), who points out the striking correlation between financial
crises during the downward slide of the Great Depression and reduc-
tions in output in excess of what one would have predicted from the
behavior ofthe money stock alone.
To test the adequacy of this hypothesis about the important role
played by financial panics, we examine the effect of removing panic
periods on various measures ofmacroeconomic stability. We focus on
the period 1890-1913, before the founding of the Fed, when panics
should have had their greatest impact. According to one formulation
of the point of view, periods immediately after financial panics have
lower levels of "equilibrium" output. Therefore, under this formula-
tion, the variance ofreal GNPabout trend should be significantly lower
if the immediate aftermath of panics is excluded from analysis.
According to an alternative formulation, panics occur at the ends of
periods of "overtrading," of "speculation." Therefore the periods im-
mediately before panics are periods ofabnormally high output, and the
aftermath ofthe panic-which sees the decline ofoutput back to trend
and then below trend to its trough-is not necessarily characterized
by an excessively high variance of real GNP about trend. But in this
case the aftermath of panics should show an excessively large and
negative average value for the rate ofchange ofreal GNP: ifthe decline
from overfull output to some level of low intermediation equilibrium
is to be ascribed to the panic, the decline must take place quickly,
before the financial system recovers its ability to provide credit. In the
limit, ifthe economy grew at a constant rate except for panic induced
declines, then excluding panic periods would reduce the variance of
the rate of growth to zero. In practice, one would still expect the
exclusion of the large negative growth rates during panics to reduce
the calculated variance of the growth rate.
We considered two possible ways to identify panics., First, there is
the list of major panics that Sprague considers important enough to
warrant chapters in his book. In the period from 1890 to 1910, from
the beginning of the Gordon output series to the publication of Spra-
gue'sbook, Spraguefinds incidents wortha chapteroccurringinAugust
1890, May through July 1893, and October 1907. An alternative, less689 Cyclical Variability of Economic Activity in the United States
judgmental definition ofa "panic"-as a time in which either there is
a (month-to-month) jump of one percentage point in the commercial
paper rate orbanks cease paying out deposits at par-produces twelve
panics in the relevant period: 1890:4, 1893:2, 1893:3, 1896:1, 1896:3,
1898:2, 1899:4, 1901:2, 1903:2, 1905:4, 1907:4, and 1909:4. Note that
two of these less judgmentally defined panics, 1893:2 and 1893:3, are
really part of a single disturbance according to Sprague.
Given these two lists of panics, we calculated variances for both
the logarithm ofoutput and the quarterly rate of change ofoutput for
several different sets ofperiods: first for the entire period 1890-1913,
then for the period with the panic quarters and three quarters on each
side of them removed, for the period with the panic quarter and one
quarter on each side removed, and last with the panic quarter and the
two following quarters removed. The r1esults were as shown in
table 12.3.
Given the results ofthis simple exercise, it is hard to argue that there
is any way more than 20% of the standard deviation of either output
or its rate of change could be ascribed to the influence of financial
panics. Since nearly 40% ofthe variance in nominal monetary growth
is attributable topanicperiods, this suggests thatfinancial andmonetary
shocks are less important sources ofdepression than we had suspected.
Note that this exercise places an upper bound on the influence of
financial panics: ifwhatever causes steep recessions also increases the
probability of financial panics, the pattern shown in table 12.3 could
be generated easily without any direct path of transmission from fi-
nancial panics to the macroeconomy.
Are the numbers generated by this exercise reasonable? Is there any
way to rationalize the apparent lack of strong links between financial
uproar and real recession? We believe that the conclusions of the ex-
ercise above are reasonable, because the effects of financial panics
upon the rest ofthe real economy are smaller than is usually realized.
12.1.3 The 1907 Panic
We illustrate this by considering in somt~ detail one typical panic.
Consider the panic of 1907, which occurred two quarters into a reces-
sion that saw a year-over-yeardecline in outputofapproximately 6.4%.
It was marked by the typical features ofSprague's major panics: nom-
inal interest rates suddenly increase, banks outside New York City
attempt to reduce their loan portfolios, everyone scrambles for liquid-
ity, banks refuse to payout cash on demand at par to depositors, and
"business activity" slumps by 26% from the quarter before to two
quarters after the panic (see Sprague 1910).
But what is most interesting is the smallness of the movements




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.691 Cyclical Variability of Economic Activity in the United States
banks refuse to payout cash for deposits at par, one dollar in bank
deposits suddenly becomes a commodity with a cash price; in the
panic of 1907, the "price" of deposits followed the smooth path
given in table 12.4. Similarly, with the breakdown of the regular
system of intermediation, one thousand dollars in deposits in New
York suddenly became a commodity with a price in Philadelphia or
Saint Louis.
These deviations from par are all small, taking the values as of
26 October(they are within the normal range) as a basisfor comparison.
Even at the height ofthe crisis a bank in Saint Louis could still obtain
deposits in New York by paying a premium ofless than 1%. Similarly,
the premium required on cash to make depositors willing to keep their
deposits in banks never rose above 3%.
It is likely that these prices do not give a good idea ofthe full extent
ofthe panic. Agents may well have attempted to preserve the goodwill
of their traditional customers by continuing to trade with them on
"normal" terms of trade; "new" customers may have faced prices
significantly farther from par than those given above. It is clear that
the deviations from par values of bank deposits could have had a de-
cisive effect on the profitability ofany enterprise only ifit were lever-
aged to an extraordinary degree. Ifthe quantity ofcredit were rationed
to familiar customers at "normal" prices, the panic could have had
significant real effects without these effects' leaving their traces in the
numbers oftable 12.4.
But the quantity ofcredit outstanding was not significantly reduced
during the panic of 1907, at least according to Sprague. Between
22 August and 3 December, the volume ofloans outstanding decreased
Table 12.4 Financial Disturbances Associated with the Panic of 1907

















































Source: Sprague 1910 and Andrew 1908.
aAverage weekly discount from par of bank deposits priced in currency.
bFor bank-to-bank transactions.692 J. Bradford DeLong/Lawrence H. Summers
by only 2%. Sprague concludes that for the crisis of 1907 at least, "it
seemsfair to assume thatpositiveloan contractionwas a comparatively
slight disturbing factor." The fall in output from August to December
was far greater, proportionately, than the decline in credit outstanding.
Moreover, the New York Clearing House banks, the linchpins ofthe
financial system, increased their loans-from $712 million to $775 mil-
lion. A reduction in the quantity of credit available on account of the
panic could not have had severe repercussions on the level of real
output.
How, in the face of the depositors' scramble for liquidity that was
oneofthe majorcharacteristics ofthe panic, did banks manage to avoid
a major contraction in the volume ofloans? Two ways. The first was
the suspension ofcash payments to depositors at par that has already
been mentioned. The second way was the creation ofnew reserves by
the banking system. On the assumption that privately created reserves
functioned as the equal of high-powered money, private actions in-
creased the monetary base by 10% during the latermonths ofthe panic.
Privately created reserves were oflimited acceptability, it is true, but
within the banking system the $238 million oflarge-denomination cer-
tificates issued by the New York Clearing House and backed by the
long-run assets ofthe clearinghouse banks functioned penectly well as
high-powered money. And these $238 million of extra reserves were
also augmented by $23 million of small clearinghouse certificates, by
$12 million ofclearinghouse checks, by $14 million ofcashier's checks,
and by $47 million of manufacturers' paychecks-all of which func-
tioned in at least some spheres as substitutes for currency (see Andrew
1908, reprinted in Sprague 1910).
The small changes in the prices of financial resources during the
panic of 1907 and the quick action of private agents to take over the
function of the nonexistent lender of last resort-the function of pro-
viding additional reserves-seemto indicate that the American national
banking system had by then developed a pattern ofbehavior that kept
financial stringencyfrom having devastatingeffects onthe realeconomy.7
These considerations lead us to doubt that the reduced volatility of
output during the postwar period was primarily the result ofthe avoid-
ance offinancial panics. We do not mean, however, that panics never
had real effects. In particular, during the Great Depression, when the
presence of the Fed discouraged banks from taking collective action
to avoid disastrous consequences but the Fed itself was passive, fi-
nancial panics may well have played an important role. But the view
that financial panics were a principal cause of economic instability
before World War II does not seem to be strongly supported. This
7. Cagan 1965 also notes the existence ofunauthorized money creation during panics.693 Cyclical Variability of Economic Activity in the United States
finding weakens the monetarist argument linking output variability to
erratic monetary growth by showing that relatively little of the vari-
ability in output observed before World W'ar II can be linked to ex-
ogenous changes in the money stock. We 'wrill return to the question
of changing monetary policy in section 12.4.
The analysis so far suggests that it is unlikely that either structural
or monetary factors can account for the d1ecline in the variability of
output since World War II. The one plausible lead we have uncovered
is the increasing role of government. We investigate the role of stabi-
lization policy in the next section.
12.2 The Effects of Stabilization Policies
A major difference between the pre- and post-World War II periods
was the government's acceptance after World War II of an obligation
to stabilize the economy. This obligation was recognized by statute in
the Employment Act of 1946 and pragmatically in the speeches and
actions of various high officials. It is natural to conjecture that this
change in attitudes and policies contributed to the decline in the vol-
atilityofoutputobservedafterWorld WarII. Itis alsofrequently argued
that automatic stabilization in the form ofa progressive tax system and
countercyclical expenditure measures such as unemployment insur-
ance have enhanced economic stability by reducing the multiplier.
Econometric exercises support this hypothesis: Hickman and Coen's
(1976) estimates ofthe real autonomous expenditures impact multiplier
drop from 3.23 in the interwar period to 1.88 in the postwar period.
This section examines the contribution of both automatic fiscal stabi-
lizers and discretionary policies in explaining the postwarimprovement
in economic performance.
12.2.1 Automatic Stabilizers
The traditional argument that automatic stabilization has improved
macroeconomic performance emphasizes the role oftaxes and transfers
in mitigating the effects of changes in GNP' on disposable income.8
This account is less satisfactory than itfirst appears. Moderntheories
ofthe consumption function assume consulners' ability to smooth out
fluctuations in disposable income by borrowing and lending. If con-
sumers in fact possess this ability, it is not clear why the government's
smoothing the path ofdisposable income through fiscal actions should
have real effects. Automatic stabilization policies will have important
real effects only if a sizable fraction of consumption represents pur-
chases by liquidity-constrained consumers. Thus, establishing the ex-
8. See, for example, the treatment in Burns 1960, (J-ordon 1984, or Baily 1978.694 J. Bradford DeLong/Lawrence H. Summers
istence of liquidity-constrained consumers is necessary to a demon-
stration of the efficacy of automatic stabilization policy. But this
discussionraises anotherpossibility. Perhaps the multiplierhas changed
over time because the fraction ofliquidity-constrained consumers has
declined owing to growth in the availability ofconsumer credit.
This section explores these issues. We begin by documenting the
changing relationship betweenGNPand disposable income fluctuations
over time, then we examine the importance ofliquidity constraints.
We have already emphasized the importance of the increasing size
ofgovernment. The extent to which this growth has changed the nexus
between GNP and disposable income can be seen in table 12.5, which
reports the results of regressions of disposable income on GNP for
various subperiods ofthe period 1898-1982. We use slightly different
subperiods here than in the preceding sections because data on dis-
posable income do not go all the way back to 1890. The results indicate
a dramatic change in the relation between the prewar and postwar
periods. During 1949-82 a marginal dollar of GNP raised disposable
income by thirty-nine cents compared with seventy-six cents during
the prewar period. There is no strong evidence ofany change between
the pre-World War I period and the interwar period in the share of
GNP changes that falls on disposable income.
The changing relationship between GNP and disposable income is
well illustrated by the two recent serious United States recessions.
During the 1981-82 recession when GNP fell by 1.8%, disposable in-
come actually rose by 1.0%. Duringthe 1973-75 recessionwhenoutput
fell by a comparable amount, disposable income rose by 1.1%.
Fiscal policies are not the only determinant of the linkage between
GNP and disposable income. Other considerations include the cyclical
Table 12.5 Response of Disposable Income to a Change in Total Income
Period Coefficient ofa y W- OW
1898-1916 .76 .54 0.97
(.16)
1923-40 .95 .61 1.70
(.24)
1949-82 .39 .59 2.07
(.06)
Source: Annual datataken from Kuznets 1961, Goldsmith 1955, and the National income
and product accounts. Before 1929, "disposable income" is approximated by nominal
income minus the sum of federal, state, and local government revenues and minus
corporate gross internal saving.
Note: Equation estimated in real magnitudes,
~ yd = Co + a(~ y) + e,
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effects on the distribution of factor incomes, and corporate payout
policies also impinge on the relationship. We briefly examined these
issues butfound little evidence that changes in these otherfactors have
worked to stabilize disposable income in the postwar period. We thus
credit fiscal policies with almost all the changes shown in table 12.5.
This conclusion runs somewhat counter to Burns's (1960) rather im-
pressionistic discussion, but we do not pursue the issue here.
The foregoing discussion is relevant to th(~ behavior ofreal economic
activity only if liquidity constraints are important in determining ag-
gregate consumption. To identify the extent ofliquidity constraints, we
model aggregate consumption as a combination ofthe consumption of
unconstrained consumers whose consumption evolves according to a
random walk as specified in Hall (1978), and liquidity-constrained con-
sumers whose consumption is assumed to be a constant fraction of
disposable income.
For convenience we work with the data in logarithmic form. 9 We
postulate that consumption ofnondurable goods and services evolves
according to:
(1)
where Ctu represents unconstrained consumption and m indicates
approximately the fraction of disposable income spent by liquidity-
constrained consumers. The polar case, \\'here m = 0, gives rise to
the pure permanent income hypothesis. When m = 1, consumption
depends just on current disposable income.
The argument of Hall (1978) implies, assuming that the real rate of
return can be approximated as a constant, that
(2)
where V t is uncorrelated with any information available at time t - 1.
To estimate m we proceed as follows. First we assume that YD
evolves according to a second-order autoregression process. That is,
(3)
Combining (1) and (2) and (3), we obtain the estimable equation:
(4) Ct = bo + blCt - 1 + m[po + (PI - bl)YDt - 1
+ PzYDt - z + P3(t)],
where et is a residual that is uncorrelated with the variables on the
right-hand side of(4). Now (3) and (4) can be estimatedjointly to yield
9. We also worked with the model in level form, but we found that the overidentifying
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estimates of m. The overidentifying restrictions implied by the model
can be tested by estimating (3) and (4) in unconstrained fashion.
Estimates ofboth restricted and unrestricted forms ofthe system (3)
and (4) using annual data on the consumption ofnondurables and ser-
vices are presented in table 12.6 for various periods. The results for
the prewar periods are striking. For 1899-1916 the data support the
hypothesis that essentially all consumption was done by liquidity-
constrained consumers. Moreover, the overidentifying restrictions im-
plied by the model are accepted comfortably. The results for the entire
prewar period also support this conclusion, though they are less sat-
isfactory. In the constrained equation case the point estimate of m is
1.4, which is implausibly large. The overidentifying restrictions are
also less well satisfied. These less satisfactory results probably occur
because our autoregression is not a good predictor of future income
during the depression. When (in results not shown) the depression years
are dropped from the sample but the 1920s are included, the results
look very much like those for 1899-1916.
Unfortunately, the extent ofliquidity constraints in the postwar pro-
cess is difficult to gauge because disposable income was not far from
following a random walk. However, the point estimates of both the
constrained and the unconstrained versions of the model suggest that
some but not all consumers were liquidity constrained. Unfortunately,
the data have the power to reject neither of the interesting polar hy-
potheses. Hence nothing definitive can be said. 10
Taken togetherthese estimates confirm thatliquidity constraints mat-
ter for aggregate consumption, as already asserted by Flavin (1981).
Table 12.6 Estimates of the Extent of Liquidity Constraints
Period Restricted Y- 1 Y-2 C-1 m LogL
1949-82 No 1.02 -.30 .012 .73 .014 .28 192.32
(.19) (.18) (.077) (.13) (005) (.31)
1949-82 Yes .77 .06 .056 1.00 .50 189.89
(.15) (.14) (.14) (.02) (.46)
1899-1916 No .35 -.05 .02 -.1 .01 1.1 70.28
(.22) (.23) (.01) (.3) (.01) (1.2)
1899-1916 Yes .33 .20 0.14 -.1 1.1 69.35
(.17) (.12) (.005) (.2) (.1)
1899-1916 No 1.17 -.35 .003 .43 .013 .54 99.14
1922-40 (.16) (.15) (002) (.14) (.004) (.41)
1899-1916 Yes 1.07 -.31 .005 .62 1.4 97.63
1922-40 (.12) (.10) (.002) (.09) (.2)
Note: The left-hand columns are estimates of equation (3) while estimates of (4) are on the right-
hand side. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
10. We also examined quarterly data for this interval but did not find that they shed
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This suggests a role for automatic stabilizers in explaining why output
was less volatile in the postwar period. They also indicate, however,
that progress in financial intermediation may have contributed to sta-
bility by enhancing the consumer's ability to smooth fluctuations in
income by borrowing. Certainly households have had much easier ac-
cess to liquidity in the postwar than in the prewar period. The most
striking rise is in the volume of consumer credit outstanding: from $6
billion in 1945, or 5% of consumption, to $380 billion or 23% of con-
sumption in 1982. The growth ofnonfarm mortgage debt has also been
remarkable: from $27 billion or 54% ofconsumption in 1934 to $1,548
billion or 82% ofconsumption in 1982. By and large, before World War
II American households had (except for some mortgages and loans
intended to support the leveraged purchase of securities) little access
to credit markets. According to Robert A. Gordon's paperin Anderson
(1951), the post-World War I constructionboom was primarily in apart-
ments, not single-family houses. Since World War II households have
had a great deal ofaccess. It would be surprising ifthis structural shift
had had no macroeconomic effects.
12.2.2 Discretionary Stabilization Policy
The most direct way to assess the efficacy of discretionary stabili-
zation policies would be to examine whether discretionary policy was
countercyclical in the postwar period and to estimate its effects. This
is much easier said than done. Distinguishing the discretionary from
the automatic component of policy is difficult. Moreover, given un-
certainties about lags, gauging the effects ofpolicies is also a problem.
Exercises such as the one performed by Eckstein and Sinai in this
volume (chap. 1) tend to suggest that mont~tarypolicy caused at least
as many recessions as it prevented, and they do not find much evidence
for the success ofdiscretionary fiscal polici1es. We do not attempt such
an exercise here. Rather, we turn to a less direct test of the possible
efficacy ofdiscretionary stabilization policies.
The essential idea ofour test is as follows. The variance in real GNP
depends on both the size ofinitial shocks to it and the extent to which
they persist. Discretionary stabilization policies presumably work by
reducing the persistence of shocks to GNP, not by limiting the size of
initial shocks. Thus ifdiscretionary stabilization policies became more
efficacious in the postwar period, one would expect to see a decline in
the persistence ofoutput shocks during this time.
Table 12.7 presents estimated impulse r(~sponse functions for GNP
for various intervals. The variance of shocks is also presented. All
calculations are based on autoregressions of annual GNP data.II The
II. The data are taken from Friedman and Sch"vaTtz 1983, who try to construct
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Table 12.7 Persistence of Output Shocks
Standard Deviation
Period 0 2 3 4 of Shocks
1893-1915
AR 1 1.00 .39 .15 .06 .03 .062
(.19) (.14) (.09) (.06)
AR2 1.00 .42 .11 .02 .00 .063
(.22) (.18) (.11) (.09)
AR3 1.00 .42 .08 .08 .06 .064
(.23) (.19) (.18) (.19)
1923-40
AR 1 1.00 .87 .76 .66 .57 .095
(.12) (.21) (.28) (.32)
AR2 1.00 1.33 1.25 .97 .64 .083
(.21) (.25) (.24) (.25)
AR3 1.00 1.37 1.26 .95 .62 .086
(.26) (.29) (.30) (.28)
1949-82
AR 1 1.00 .70 .49 .35 .22 .026
(.15) (.21) (.22) (.21)
AR2 1.00 .81 .47 .22 .09 .026
(.19) (.23) (.32) (.27)
AR3 1.00 .82 .46 .24 .12 .027
(.20) (.27) (.35) (.33)
Note: Annual GNP data from Friedman and Schwartz 1983. Standard errors-generated
by stochastic simulation-in parentheses.
calculationsrevealthatifanythingthepersistenceofoutputfluctuations
increasedbetween the pre-World War I and post-World War II periods.
Concomitantly, the decline in the variance of output shocks between
the two periods exceeds the decline in the variance ofreal GNP. Thus
the data provide little support for the discretionary stabilization policy
argument.
A more subtle form of the discretionary policy argument, noted in
Baily (1978), runs as follows. Whether or not stabilization policy is
actually efficacious, it is perceived as effective. Because they expect
recessions to be short, consumers and investors do not cut back on
spending plans as much as they otherwise would. The prophecy is
therefore self-fulfilling and the economy is more stable. This argument
is also putforth to explain greaterwage and price rigidity in the postwar
period. It is suggested that because the economy is expected to return
to equilibrium more quickly, workers and producers feel less pressure
to cut wages and prices in the face of shortfalls in demand. This ar-
gument, like the more direct one, predicts that serial correlation in
output should have declined in the postwar period. As just noted, this
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The pattern followed by stock market prices provides a further way
to test arguments about confidence in the face ofeconomic downturns
ifone is willing to accept two assumptions: JFirst, that the expectations
implicit in the stock market's guesses about the discounted value ofthe
future profitability of American enterprise are the same as the expec-
tations ofthose who decide on investment. 'Ne recognize the weakness
ofthis support ofour argument, but we see no way to avoid making it
that will allow us to use the information found in the pattern of stock
prices. Second, that the relation between tht~ profitability ofthose com-
panies counted in stock market averages and the macroeconomic per-
formance oftheeconomyhas remainedconstant. As atestofthis second
assumption, we examined the cyclical variability ofdividends paid by
companies listed in the Standard and Poor's 500 index; we cannot find
any significant changes in the cyclical flexibility of dividends, and so
we are led to tentatively accept this second assumption.
The stock market is a leading indicator. It typically reaches its real
peak several quarters before output. The agents whose expectations
set prices in the stock market know a recession is coming. The mag-
nitude ofthe decline in profitability that they expect can be seen in the
magnitude of the decline in profitability that they expect can be seen
in the magnitude ofthedecline in the stockITlarket. And so the elasticity
of the level of the stock market with respect to future values of the
GNP gap is a measure of the "sanguinity" of stock market investors,
a measure ofthe subjective probability assigned to the possibility that
the recession may be the beginning ofa deep, long period ofsubnormal
output rather than a short, shallow correction to the economy.
Accordingly, we regressed the log ofthe real value oftwo stock mar-
ket indexes (the Dow-Jones industrial and Standard and Poor's com-
posite) on a quadratic in time and on five, six, and nine leads (for quar-
terly data) ofthe difference between the log ofGNP and the log ofnatural
GNP. We also correctedfor (substantial) serial correlation. Because the
behavior ofthe two indexes was nearly identical, only the Standard and
Poor's results are reported here. The pararneter ofinterest is L B j •
Interpretations ofthese results, which are: displayed in table 12.8, are
dubious, because the exceptionally large degree ofserial correlation in
the residuals tells us that whatever is moving stock prices does not fol-
Iowa simple trend and dominates those movements induced bythe near
term (within two years) cyclical outlook. There is also an errors in vari-
ables problem here: the value ofthe independent GNP gap used is the
ex post realized value rather than the ex ante expected value. To the
degree that agents do not correctly forecast the near-term cyclical out-
look, the estimates ofthe sum ofthe lag coefficients are not consistent.
Nevertheless, simple inspection ofthe various sums ofthe lead coef-
ficients does not lend support to the hypothesis ofthe increasing" san-
guinity" ofinvestors. A given cyclical movement in the GNP gap over700 J. Bradford DeLong/Lawrence H. Summers
Table 12.8 Stock Market Elasticities
n = 5 n = 6 n = 9
Period ~~ia R2 ~~i P R2 ~~i P R2
1893-1915 1.75 .73 .975 2.12 .73 .975 2.20 .76 .977
(.50) (.08) (.57) (.08) (.79) (.08)
1922-40 1.81 .82 .905 1.69 .81 .905 1.56 .75 .912
(.59) (.07) (.61) (.07) (.56) (.08)
1947-70 3.51 .95 .945 .233 .94 .953 1.05 .93 .965
(.92) (.03) (.99) (.03) (1.07) (.04)
1947-80 2.90 .92 .929 2.32 .92 .934 1.13 .90 .944
(.83) (.03) (.90) (.03) (1.06) (.04)
1970-80 3.52 .78 .987 3.59 .78 .987 3.17 .78 .987
(1.47) (.10) (1.57) (.10) (1.98) (.11)
Note: Estimation procedure described in text.
aSum of leads.
the two years to come seems to be preceded by a relative decline in
the stock market that is, if anything, larger since World War II than it
was before. A given expected decline in real GNP relative to trend
seems to be associated with a slightly greater decline in the discounted
value offuture profits-as measured by the stock market-than before
World War II. This simple exercise seems to indicate that those in-
vesting in the stock market do not expect the same initial decline in
GNP to be recouped more quickly-owing to government stabilization
policies-after World War II than before.
The analysis in this section suggests that automatic stabilizers have
contributed to the reduction in variance ofGNPthathas beenobserved
since World War II. There is little evidence that discretionary policies
have played an importantrole. Indeed, thepersistenceofoutput shocks
has actually increased. But it seems unlikely that automatic stabiliza-
tion can account for the whole ofthe decline in the variance ofoutput.
The declines in the volatility of investment that have been observed
since the war exceed the declines in the volatility of consumption.
Moreover, quantitative estimates ofthe change in the Keynesian mul-
tiplier such as those provided by Hickman and Coen (1976) are not
large enough to accountfor a threefold decline in the variance ofoutput
shocks reported in table 12.7. We therefore turn in the next section to
an examination ofother structural changes that may contribute to ex-
plaining the declining variance ofoutput.
12.3 Price and Output Flexibility
Some common contemporary explanations ofbusiness cycles focus
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atomistic competitivemodel ofclassicaleconomic theory. Forexample,
long-term nominal labor contracts are sOlTletimes invoked to explain
how nominal shocks can have real effects on economic activity. Al-
ternatively, long-term attachments between workers and firms com-
bined with asymmetrical information-in a phrase, implicit contracts-
are sometimes invoked to account for involuntary unemployment and
cyclical fluctuations.
The evidence presented in this section suggests that this focus may
well be misplaced. We show in the first part of this section that in a
variety of ways the American economy has become much less "Wal-
rasian" over the same century that has also seen a pronounced trend
toward greater macroeconomic stability. This suggests that the sources
of economic instability do not lie in the non-Walrasian character of
certain economic institutions}2 We then demonstrate that plausible
macroeconomic models imply that increased price rigidity will increase
rather than reduce macroeconomic stability. Finally, we suggest that
price flexibility, by raising real interest rates, may have exacerbated
the 1929-33 economic downturn.
The extent to which the economy was "Walrasian" in the past is
obviously impossible to gauge precisely. ~~arket power depends not
only on the extent ofconcentration in product and labor markets, but
also on factors such as costs of search and the extent of information
asymmetries. All these factors share the c:haracteristic of being very
hard to quantify. However, the available evidence suggests that the
American economy was significantly mort~ competitive before World
War II than it has been since.
One indicator is the increased role of government after World War
II. The share of GNP passing through the public sector rose from
approximately 4% about 1900 to approxinlately 10% in 1929-37 and
to about 16% by 1970. Ofpotentially greatc~r importance is the greatly
increased scope ofgovernment regulation: by the estimates of Nutter
and Einhorn (1969), close to 22% ofGNP produced in 1958 came from
sectors of the economy where government was a predominant pres-
ence. And this estimate predates the rise in the 1960s and 1970s of
what is termed the "regulatory state."
A similar conclusion is suggested by the available data on industrial
concentration. The percentage of national income originating in pro-
prietorships dropped from 28% in 1929 to 18% in 1969. In 1918, 35%
of total manufacturing assets were held by the nation's one hundred
12. Of course, it is possible that, as John Taylor argued in his paper in this volume
(chap. 11), increasing price rigidity did exacerbate cyclical fluctuations, but that this
influence was more than offset by other factors. We further discuss Taylor's analysis in
our comment on his contribution, chapter 11.702 J. Bradford DeLong/Lawrence H. Summers
largest manufacturing corporations. By 1970 their share had reached
49%.
Perhaps the most dramatic changes have occurred in the character
of the labor market. Some information on the changing character of
labormarkets is presented in table 12.9. A clearpatternemerges. Long-
term contracts were essentially nonexistent before passage ofthe Wag-
ner Act. A small proportion of workers were in unions, and the pre-
vailing political climate offered unions few of the sources of institu-
tionalized strength that legal procedures gave them in the postwar period.
The share ofunionized nonfarm workers was only 9%in 1930 compared
with 29% in 1950. Likewise, the fraction ofworkers in institutionalized
settings has increased dramatically. The fraction working on farms has
fallen from 38% in 1900 to 3% in 1970, and in 1900 close to halfofall
farmers were owner-operators. And the fraction of workers in white-
collar jobs increased from 17% in 1900 to 48% in 1970. This is an
interesting statistic in light ofthe fact that a substantial proportion of
white-collar workers are engaged in what one might call non-market-
oriented coordination ofproduction.
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the changng character of labor
markets comes from information on separations. Ross (1958) examines
the argument that a new industrial feudalism developed in the United
States after World War II. As table 12.10 indicates, the monthly quit
rate perhundred employees in manufacturing (the only sectoron which
data are available) declines from over 6% before World War I to close
by 2% recently. The total separation rate declined by about 42% be-
tween 1920-23 and 1973-79, implying an equal percentage increase in
average manufacturingjobtenure. Even though most turnover involves
Source: Historical Statistics.
aMore than one-third of these unions were broken during the deflation that followed
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Table 12.10 Peacetime Business Cycle Averages of Quit and Separation Rates























Source: Historical Statistics and Ross 1958.
the young, these data still indicate a substantial increase over time in
the importance of something that might be~ called job-specific human
capital, and therefore in implicit long-term labor contracts.
Quantifying the extent of deviation from the Walrasian ideal owing
to more subtle factors such as increased labor market specialization
and increased product differentiation is obviously not possible. How-
ever, a number of things suggest those factors have increased in im-
portance. Expenditures on advertising and promotion have surely in-
creased faster than the GNP, suggesting a greater role in firms facing
downward sloping product demand areas. The educational level ofthe
workforce has risengreatly, as has the numberofdifferentoccupations.
To gauge the extent of imperfections in today's economy, one need
only ask how many firms are indifferent to selling more output at
prevailing prices. Or how many workers are indifferent to losing their
jobs.
It seems very likely that increased economic stability has been a by-
product ofthese developments. Permanent attachments between work-
ers and firms, for example, slow the response of employment to fluc-
tuations in demand. This in tum reduces the extent to which demand
shocks are propagated by increasing the stability ofdisposable income.
More formally, it is possible to demonstrate in a variety of implicit
contracting models that because ofworkers' desire for insurance, em-
ployment is more stable than it would be if a Walrasian equilibrium
were attained in every period. Likewise, increasing conglomeration of
firms, and the resulting increased reliance on internal finance, reduces
the liquidity effects ofeconomic downturns. It is also natural to con-
jecturethat regulatory policies are likely to keep the outputofregulated
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It is unquestionably true that price volatility in the American econ-
omy declined in conjunction with the changes discussed above. The
standard deviation ofannual rates ofinflation from trend was 1.5% for
1949-82, compared with 2.4% for 1893-1915 and 4.8% for 1923-40.
It is less clear whether wages and prices have become more flexible in
response to output shocks of a given size. Cagan (1975) and Sachs
(1980) report that wholesale prices have been less sensitive to move-
ments in aggregate demand during the postwar period. However,
Schultze (1981) argues that there was little change in the sensitivity of
prices-measured by the nonfarm GNP deflator-between the prewar
and postwar periods. Gordon (1980) finds that the initial response of
prices to nominal demand has not changed but notes the increasing
persistence of inflation in the postwar period. 13
It is not easy to make a coherent interpretation ofthese findings. We
suspect there has been a small decline in short-run price flexibility (a
decline in the slope of the short-run aggregate supply curve) but that
this decline has been so small that it is not apparent in the less sensitive
GNP deflator and can be seen only in measures ofproducer prices. We
do conclude that there has been an increase in the persistence ofprice
movements. Below, we present a simple model to analyze the effect
of an increase in such persistence on macroeconomic performance.
Before examining this issue, it is important to emphasize that the evi-
dence presented in the preceding section suggests that greater price
rigidity in the postwar period cannot be attributed to greater certainty
that downturns would be temporary. This possibility is refuted by the
evidence suggesting that output shocks have become more, not less,
persistent and that the sensitivity ofthe stock market to output shocks
has if anything declined.
12.3.1 Is Price Flexibility Destabilizing?
In the remainder of this section, we entertain the hypothesis that
greater price flexibility in the pre-World War II period was a cause of
greater instability in output. This is, of course, the exact opposite of
the canonical Keynesian nominal rigidities point ofview, which leads,
in John Taylor's words, to the assertion that "less flexible wages and
prices should lead to a deterioration ofmacroeconomic performance."
ButJohn Maynard Keynes disagreed, and in The General Theory (1936)
he argued against this very proposition, claiming instead that
it would bemuchbetterthatwages should be rigidly fixed anddeemed
incapable of material changes, than that depression should be ac-
companied by a gradual downward tendency of money-wages, a
13. And Schultze also finds increasing persistence after 1967, which he interprets as
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further moderate wage reduction being expected to signalize each
increase of, say, one percent in the amount of unemployment. For
example, the effect ofan expectation that wages are going to sag by,
say, two percent in the coming year will be roughly equivalent to the
effect of a rise of two percent in the amount ofinterest payable for
the same period. (Quoted in Tobin 1975)
Keynes seeks to argue that the simple solution to involuntary unem-
ployment-lowering the nominal wage-\vill not work. For the econ-
omy is not a static object converging to a stationary equilibrium. The
lowering of wages (and prices) required to get the quantity of real
balances up to its full employment equilibrium value itself creates an
additional intertemporal disequilibrium. For changes in the aggregate
price level disturb what is perhaps the single most important price in
the whole economy-the real interest rate.
This point of view deserves a more fonnal examination, which we
provide within the framework ofa simple lnacroeconomic model. The
model highlights the fact that it is the ex ante real-not the nominal-
interest rate that should enter into the det(~rminationofinvestment. It
also provides for the distinction between price flexibility and price
persistence stressed by Gordon (1980).
We treat all variables (except interest and inflation rates) as log de-
viations from trends. Solving out an IS-LM[ system, where the nominal
interest rate enters the LM equation and the real interest rate enters
the IS equation, yields an aggregate demand curve of the form:
(5)
We model expectations by assuming perf1ect foresight on the part of
investors:
(6) EtPt+l = Pt+l·
The aggregate supply side ofthe model is somewhat more complex.
An easy way to model the independent dimensions of short-run price
flexibility and of price persistence is to adopt a multiperiod nominal
contract framework. Workers are divided into n + 1 equal groups.
Group}negotiates an n + 1period contract, with a fixed nominal wage,




W{+ 1 = W{,) =1= (t)mod n+ 1
1 ~ U") U ") W{+1 = Wj + - LJ (W -I "?od n+l - W -.' mod n+l) + aqt.
t n ;=1 t+l-1 t-I
In the contract period, group}'s nominal 'wage is renegotiated for the
next n + 1 periods. The wage rise won by group}in these negotiations706 J. Bradford DeLong/Lawrence H. Summers
is the average of the wage rise won by the other n groups in their
negotiations plus or minus a term (exqt) which is supposed to capture
the effect oflabor market tightness. In their negotiations, workers are
backward looking. Since we are working within the Keynesian tradi-
tion, we do not think this is an important defect in the model. 14 More-
over, any attempt to model the wage determination process fully within
an optimizing framework would be hopelessly complex.
To close the model, the price level is taken to be a simple average
of the prevailing wage levels:
(9)
n+1





(I + n)(pt+ 1 - Pt) = - «n + 1)[(Pt - Pt- I)
n
+ ... + (Pt-n+1 - Pt-n)]) + exqt
1 ex
Pt+1 - Pt = -;; (Pt - Pt-n) + ;-+l qt ,
n - ~2ex(_n) n - 1
which, with (5) and (6), results in workable solutions for Pt and qt






Pt-I-n + mt-I + 1 _ Q. Et-I·
n + 1 - ~2ex n + tJ2ex
In this framework, increases in the contract period-n + l-can be
interpreted as increases in price persistence. Increases in the labor
market conditions coefficients-increases in ex-can be interpreted as
increases in short-run aggregate price flexibility. Because the model is
designed to highlight the effects of inflation on output, it has no role
for discretionary fiscal policy and no source of shocks other than Et ,
the shock to aggregate demand. We take monetary policy to be com-
pletely nonaccommodative: mt is equal to its trend value (zero) always.
14. In subsequent work, we hope to examine the issues here within a model like that
ofTaylor 1979, where contracts are partlyforward and partly backward looking. Itseems
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This rules out the possibility that the driving force behind economic
instability is inappropriate.government policy (a bad monetary reaction
function) rather than the internal dynamics ofthe model itself. We wish
to use this model to show only that the conventional wisdom holding
that an increase in nominal rigidities (either in the form of a smaller
response ofwages to labor market conditions or in the form ofa longer
contract period-more "persistence") is harmful to macroeconomic
stability rests on shaky theoretical foundations.
We assume a white noise, unit variance generating process for the
demand shock Et and simulate the model for various parameter val-
ues. Recall that a high value of ~l implies either that the direct
("liquidity") effect of a decline in real balances is large or that the
effect of a decline in real balances on the interest rate is large-that
is, that the elasticity of money demand with respect to the interest
rate is small. A high value for ~2 implies that the expected inflation
effects on aggregate demand are large, oV/ing either to real interest
effects or to redistributions between debtors and creditors. The pa-
rameter estimates are chosen to be reasonable. For example, if ~I
= 1.0 and ~2 = 1.6, the standard IS-L~vf Keynesian multiplier is
1.5.15 Experimenting with parameter values outside the range dis-
played frequently resulted in instability but did not alter the quali-
tative conclusions.
Three conclusions emerge from table 12.11, where the variance of
output is calculated for various parameter values. First, in many cases
the economy is unstable under the assumption that monetary policy is
nonaccommodative with respect to output shocks. This result parallels
that of Tobin (1975). Second, in the cases where stability is attained,
the variance ofoutput decreases with increases in the contract length. 16
When the lengthofthe period overwhich wages remain fixed increases,
the volatility ofoutputdeclines. This result implies thatincreasing wage
flexibility by reducing the length of the contract period might well
worsen macroeconomic performance. This inference is strengthened
by noting that increasing the length of the contract period increases
the likelihood that the economy will be stable at all. Third, increases
in the sensitivity ofcurrent wages to output have an ambiguous effect
on the volatility of output.
These results are entirely attributable to the fact that the real interest
rate-and so EtPt+ I-enters into the determination ofaggregate demand.
The model considered here obviously is highly stylized. No role is
allowed for lagged responses of output or money demand to changes
15. Assuming that the constant interest rate multiplier is 3.0.
16. Except for cases in which a high adjustment parameter combined with a long
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in real interest rates. Deflation has no dire~ct effect on aggregate de-
mand, operating only through its impact on real interest rates. Thus
the distributional effects emphasized by Tobin (1975) are suppressed
entirely. Perhaps most important, we assume no response ofmonetary
orfiscal policy variables to demand shocks. rrhis exercise hardly proves
that price flexibility increased the volatility ofeconomic activity before
World War II. But it does strongly suggest that deviations of the real
interest rates from its general equilibrium value caused by the process
ofequilibration in product and labor markets may contribute as much
to economic instability as deviations in product prices or wages from
their static equilibrium values, if not more.
It might be objected that our analysis here misses the point, since
we assume an aggregate supply mechanisml implying that a change in
the monetary rule could have a long-run 'effect on output. Such an
objection is made by McCallum (1983) to analyses similar to the one
presented here. This objection is misplaced. At one level the criticism
is irrelevant, since we do not use our model to consider alternative
monetary rules. At a more fundamental level, it ignores the need for
economic theory to provide a theory of how prices move to clear
markets. As Fisher (1983) and others have eloquently argued, it is
insufficient to assert that economies will al\vays reach their Walrasian
equilibriums without describing how they get there. Some sort ofprice
adjustment equation like (11) is an indispensable part of any fully ar-
ticulated economic model.
A macroeconomic view that stresses the dangerous potential for
destabilizing deflation present under a regime of flexible prices can
avoid some of the problems that economists have traditionally en-
countered while trying to analyze the origins of the Great Depression
in the United States. Economists like Terrlin (1974), who attempt to
account for the Great Depression by a decline in exogenous spending
induced by falling "animal spirits," have a difficult time explaining why
those who make investment decisions suddenly become more pessi-
mistic. Without making reference to the de:stabilizing effects of defla-
tion, it is also difficult to account for rising real interest rates in the
face of an autonomous decline in spending.
Economists like Friedman and Schwartz (1963), who attempt to ac-
count for the Great Depression in terms of an inappropriately con-
tractionary monetary policy, have a difficult time explaining the be-
havior ofthe real money supply. As figure 12.3 shows, the real money
supply actually increased slightly between 1929 and 1933 while output
was falling by close to 50%. Since aggregate demand should be closely
linked to the real money supply, itis hardto see howa monetaryimpulse
could have caused the depression without ever reducing real money
balances. Moreover, without making reference to the effects of defla-710 J. Bradford DeLong/Lawrence H. Summers
1920 1925 1930 1935 1940
Fig. 12.3 Percentage deviation ofthe real money supply (Ml) from its
average 1926-29 value.
tion, it is hard to explain why nominal interest rates fell in the face of
a monetary shock.
More generally, evidence for the view that increased price flexibility
is destabilizing comes from an examination of the changing behavior
of real interest rates plotted in figure 12.4. The standard deviation of
ex post real rates on an annual basis was 3.10% in the period 1893-
1915, compared with 0.57% in 1949-70and 1.37% in 1971-82.17 Before
1979, the highest real interest rate observed on a quarterly basis was
6% in 1974, and in only five quarters in the pre-1979 post-World War
II period were real rates greater than 4% observed. On the other hand,
17. The behavior of real rates since 1979 is, in the context of the rest of the post-
World War II period, anomalous. A glance at recent real rates seems to suggest that
American economic policymakers are attempting to restore the pattern of real rates
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Fig. 12.4 Ex post short-term real interest rates.
real rates greater than 6% occurred in every single reference cycle
recession(except 1903-04)during the pre-\\lorld War I period. Itseems
clear that these variations in real rates should have contributed greatly
to economic instability.
12.4 Is Aggregate Price Flexibility Destabilizing?
In section 12.3 we argued that in the standard aggregate demand/
aggregate supply framework there are no strong theoretical reasons for
believing that a small increase in aggregatt~ price flexibility-defined
either as an increase in the responsiveness of wages to labor market
conditions or as a decrease in "persistence"'-would reduce the vari-
ance of output. We also expressed our suspicion that in the United
States the relation between price and output flexibility goes the other
wayfrom thattypically assumed. We suggestedthat some ofthe relative712 J. Bradford DeLong/Lawrence H. Summers
macroeconomic good fortune ofthe United States since World War II
can be traced to the possibility that a flatter short-run aggregate supply
curve dampens fluctuations in the real interest rate and so dampens
fluctuations in output.
We putforth this potentialexplanationbecause the othermechanisms
we have identified cannot accountfor all ofthe decline in the variability
of output from the prewar to the postwar period. The rising share of
governmentexpenditures can accountfor a smallfraction ofthe decline
in variance, and the smoothing ofpurchases ofconsumer nondurables
and services as a result ofautomatic stabilizers and commercial credit
can account for a significant portion. But there remains a substantial
decline in the relative varianceof''long-term" expenditures-construc-
tion, business investment, and consumer durable purchases-that is
documented in Robert Gordon and John Veitch's paper in this volume.
The standard explanation is that this decline in the variability of"long-
term" expenditures is due to the expectation ofsuccessful stabilization
policy. But since we cannot find the traces in other economic variables
that we expected to find if this were indeed correct, we believe that
the decline in the variance of "long-term" expenditures needs further
explanation. And since "long-term" expenditures are in theory very
much dependent on the real interest rate, we advance the hypothesis
that the primary channel through which price flexibility affects mac-
roeconomic performance is the instability induced by aggregate price
flexibility in the real interest rate.
12.4.1 Reduced-Form Evidence: Theory
In this section we present some empirical evidence to back up the
hypothesis that price rigidity has contributed to macroeconomic sta-
bility. We had hoped to estimate a simple structural model and thus to
see ifthe data supported our hypothesis by testing whether the param-
eters of the structural model fell in a region where aggregate price
flexibility was destabilizing on the margin. But we are unable to do so.
Attempts at estimation repeatedly failed to converge or converged to
unstable parameter values. We appear to have been unable to nest our
hypothesis in a structural model that is both tractable, in the sense of
being simple enough for us to gain some analytic understanding of its
properties, and believable, in the sense of not being rejected out of
hand by the data.
Since the restrictions we found necessary if we were to formulate a
model that we could understand and interpret also destroyed the fit of
the model with the data, we shifted to nonstructural estimation. The
current practice among economists seeking to draw conclusions that
are not highly sensitive to minor changes in the underlying model is to
use vector autoregressions and to plot the resulting impulse response713 Cyclical Variability of Economic Activity in the United States
functions. In such an analysis, a positive response of output to an
inflation shock might be taken as evidence in favor of our approach.
We have run analyses along these lines, but we find problems in
interpreting the impulse response functions as evidence for any posi-
tion, since we have no good idea of what an "inflation shock" is or
what actual economic processes it represents. Therefore we also pre-
sent (quasi-) reduced forms for output and argue that the pattern of
coefficients that emerges is hard to justify with any underlying theo-
retical model other than our hypothesis.
According to the mainstream Keynesian macroeconomic ap-
proaches, the primary determinants ofoutput are three: lagged output,
(lagged) real money balances-operating through wealth and liquidity
effects-and the nominal interest rate. Lower real money balances
choke off aggregate demand in general, and higher nominal interest
rates reduce the demand for investment goods in particular. Whether
one believes that real balances are only a passive indicator ofnominal
interest rates, credit conditions, and animal spirits or that interest rates
are only an index of the underlying determinant, real balances, it re-
mains true thatoutput should be, in any kind ofreducedform, a positive
function of (present and) lagged real balances and a negative function
of (present and) lagged interest rates.
Implicit in the mainstream view is a "Keynesian" picture of price
adjustment. Changes in real balances or nominal interest rates cause
disturbances in aggregate demand. Becausc~ in the aggregate quantity
adjusts more quickly than price, the changes in the movement of the
price level associated with changes in real balances and in interestrates
show up----in the time period relevant to the study ofbusiness cycles-
only after the movement in output. In the Inainstream view, the price
level responds to its own lagged values and to the level of nominal
demand. The mainstream view cannot account for a significant positive
link running from prices to output without abandoning the "Keynes-
ian" interpretation ofthe relative speeds ofprice and quantity adjust-
ment that is its foundation. There is one set of events that, according
to the mainstream view, should generate a correlation between present
price movements and future output. This iis the case of the "supply
shock," in which presentjumps in prices are associated with declines
in future output. But this produces a correlation with the opposite sign
from that expected according to a theory centered on the real interest
rate.
The explanation for output fluctuations usually given by classical
economists follow these lines: some agents (workers, not firms) mis-
perceive relative prices. They believe that the real wage is higher (or
lower) than it really is and so work more (or less) than is optimal. If
there are intermediate goods in the production process, it is possible714 J. Bradford DeLong/Lawrence H. Summers
to claim that output depends both on the degree of relative price mis-
perception and on lagged production ofintermediate goods-on lagged
output. This line ofthough produces a Lucas aggregate supplyfunction:
(14)
Note that the new classical approach predicts that, in a reduced form
ofoutput on lagged output, present and lagged prices, and other vari-
ables, the only variables that can enter with positive coefficients are
lagged output. Lagged prices are useless as predictors ofPt - Et- tPt
and should, in the new classical framework, not enter into the reduced
form at all. IS Therefore we conclude that a significant positive effect
oflagged prices onpresentoutputfits easily into neitherthe mainstream
nor the new classical view ofthe macroeconomy. And we believe that
the existence of such a positive effect is evidence in favor of an older
view of business cycles, a view that places special stress on the role
of the real interest rate.
With these theoretical observations in mind, we estimated vector
autoregressions for a variety ofperiods and specifications on quarterly
data taken from Gordon (1982a) and annual data taken from Friedman
and Schwartz (1983). The results provide some evidence in favor of
ourhypothesis. A price innovation has, looking at the impulse response
functions, a positive effect on future output. And in the reduced form
for output, lagged price enters with a generally positive coefficient.
We find this significant. According to the view that stresses the im-
portance of nominal rigidities in causing business cycles, price inno-
vations have to (when nominal balances are held constant) have a
negative effect on future output. Deflation should raise the real money
stock and thus increase output. But the equations indicate, in support
of our more dynamic view, that deflation may itself lower output.
12.4.2 Reduced-Form Evidence: Empirical Results
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where A(L) is a three-by-three matrix polynomial of order five in the
lag operator. The variables in this autoregression are:
q the output ratio, real GNP/natural real GNP
18. According to the new classical view ofthings, shocks have persistent effects even
though lagged prices are not in the equation for qt. Past prices affect past output, and
past output enters the equation that determines present output.715 Cyclical Variability of Economic Activity in the United States
pthe quarter-to-quarter inflation rate
i the commercial paper rate.
(All data are taken from Gordon 1982a.)
Note that the arrangement ofthe variabl(~s in the VAR is such as to
minimize the potential impact of any innovation in p. Only that part
of
Pt - Et-tPt
that is uncorrelated with qt - Et-Iqt and it - Et-lit will be counted as
an inflation innovation. Thus the risk that our interpretation of the
results is in error, that the VAR is reading correlations betweenPand
q that are really driven by causal links fronn q to pand from lagged q
to q as evidence in favor of our hypothesis, is minimized.
The VAR was initially estimated for timt~ periods 1893:1 to 1915:4,
1923:1 to 1940:4, and 1949:1 to 1982:4. This particular three-variable
system was chosen because no quarterly data on the money stock are
available before 1907. Thus there are not lenough data to estimate a
VAR including the money stock for any prle-World War I period. We
are reluctant to base any arguments on a cornparison ofthe post-World
War II period with the interwar period alone. The Great Depression
represents an extraordinary cumulation of shocks and so is probably
not well studied using the VAR method.
..A.n objection to estimatingthis particularsystemmight be made along
the following lines: the choice of variables--output, inflation, and in-
terest rates-implies that the effects attributed to the inflation variable
are only the effects of movements in accornmodated inflation. Unac-
commodated movements in inflation will, because the interest rate is
an index ofthe real money stock, also appear as movements in interest
rates. And so some of the depressing effe(;t of price rises on output
will appear as an effect of interest rate movements on output.
Two facts militate against this argument. First, it implies that the
contemporaneous correlation between inflation and interest rates should
be positive, that 0.013 should be greater than zero. Instead, 0.013 is less
than zero (though not significantly so).
Second, the equations were also estimated for the four-equation sys-
tem consisting ofinflation, the commercial paper rate, the output ratio,
and the detrended nominal money stock. Th(~ variables were so ordered
as to give the maximum potential scope to the monetary innovation,
the second place to the outputinnovation, the third place to the interest
rate innovation, andthe leastpotential scopeto the inflation innovation.
Quasi-reduced-form equations for output are shown in table 12.12.
Impulse responses of output to an inflation innovation are plotted in
figures 12.5 and 12.6. We note two things from these empirical results.
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Fig. 12.5 Output response to inflation innovations, three-variable sys-
tem, 1949-82, 1923-40, 1893-1915.
period is so strongly dominated by the Great Depression that all cor-
relations are warped: the decline of the nominal interest rate during
the onset ofthe depression is the only variable the model can latch on
to in accounting for the depression, hence the excessively large dif-
ference in the coefficients on the first and second lag of the interest
rate. Ifone turns back to figure 12.2, this should come as no surprise.
The Great Depression was a unique event, and attempts to analyze the
entire interwar period are, in essence, attelnpts to generalize from a
sample of one.
Second, both the coefficients on lagged inflation in the output equa-
tion and the impulse responses of output to an inflation shock are
positive and, in general, significant at at least the .10% level. This
correlation is not easy to explain within eith(~r the new classical frame-
work or the mainstream framework. The hypothesis urged here, with
its emphasis on real interest rate effects, does provide a natural
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Fig. 12.6 Output response to inflation innovations, four-variable sys-
tem, 1949-82, 1949-72, 1923-40.
This beliefis bolsteredby additional equations run (butnotreported).
Forvarious combinations ofinterestrates, inflation rates, outputratios,
real and nominal money stocks, the onlyequationthatfailed togenerate
a positive correlation between inflation innovations and future output
and positive terms on lagged prices in the output equation was a VAR
that included no interest rate variable-only the output ratio, inflation,
and the nominal money stock. Furthermore, the effect oflagged infla-
tion innovations on output is significantly greater for the four-variable
system for those two post-World War II periods that do not include
the supply shock ridden 1970s. This tends to support our hypothesis.
The 1970s were dominated by supply shocks, by disturbances that first
raised pand then reduced q. These shifts in the short-run aggregate
supply schedule should mask the effects we are lookingfor in the post-
World War II period. That these supply shocks do reduce the positive
effect for the period 1949:1 to 1982:4, and that this masking is only
partial, encourages us to think that we are correctly interpreting our719 Cyclical Variability of Economic Activity in the United States
VARs and that the effect ofprice innovations is, in the United States
today, strongly procyclical.
To sum up: an unstructured analysis of the correlations between
macroeconomic variables carried out by lTleanS of VARs produces a
finding-inflation innovations have a positive effect on future output-
that is hard to interpret from either an equilibrium business cycle or a
nominal rigidities perspective. We can think of no other convincing
reasons for this association besides the one we advocate: changes in
the aggregate price level produce changes in the real cost of capital
that have effects on the level of expenditures on items having a high
interest elasticity of present value. Thus dt~flation at the beginning of
a recession would deepen the recession by causing a further cutback
in investment. This correlation suggests that reducing nominal price
rigidity would not diminish the seriousness ofbusiness cycles.
12.5 Conclusions
We beganby suggestingthatthe large change in the varianceofoutput
between the prewar and postwar periods was a fact that should be
explicable within a satisfactory business cycle theory. We then argued
that a number offactors frequently alleged to have led to greater sta-
bility, including structural changes in the economy, discretionary sta-
bilization policy, and the avoidance of financial panics, probably did
relatively little to enhance stability. We conclude that the two principal
factors promoting economic stability have been greater public and pri-
vate efforts to smoothconsumptionand the increasingrigidity ofprices.
We attribute the latterdevelopmenttothe ine-reasinginstitutionalization
ofthe economy.
Comment Robert Eisner
I am glad to find Keynes rediscovered, if only in part.
DeLong and Summers see the amplitude of cyclical fluctuations as
less in the postwar period and attribute this principally to "greater
public and private efforts to smooth consumption and the increasing
rigidity of prices." The public efforts are related to a greater govern-
ment component in aggregate demand and automatic, but not discre-
tionary, countercyclical fiscal instruments. l"he easing ofliquidity con-
straints, which DeLong and Summers relate to greater amounts and
Robert Eisner is the William R. Kenan Professor of Economics at Northwestern
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ease ofhousehold borrowing, has further encouraged a divorce ofcon-
sumption from fluctuations in current income and hence reduced the
multiplier of exogenous shocks.
DeLong and Summers reject the argument attributed to unnamed
"Keynesians" that rigid wages and prices contribute to fluctuations in
employment and output. They suggest rather, going back to Keynes
(via Tobin), that less rigid prices magnify fluctuations. A fall in prices,
for example, generates anexpectationoffalling prices. This contributes
to higher real rates ofinterest and thus aggravates the real decline that
initiated the price movement.
DeLong and Summers might well have recalled the rigorous devel-
opment of the argument by Oscar Lange (1952) that flexible prices
could not be relied upon to eliminate excess supply ofgoods or labor
(unemployment). This is not to claim, as DeLong and Summers do
(sect. 12.3), that rigidities can make employment "more stable than it
would be if a Walrasian equilibrium were attained in every period."
Walrasian equilibrium presumably means zero excess supply in all mar-
kets and hence no unemployment at all. But as Lange pointed out, if
price expectations were relatively elastic, flexible prices might not cor-
rect a situation of excess supply in commodity markets, or excess
demand for money; Walrasian equilibrium would not be attained. Sim-
ply enough, lower prices would then generate an expectation of still
lower future prices, raising the current-to-future price ratio and hence
reducing current demand for commodities and raising the real demand
for money.l
But this is not to say that, under these conditions ofrelatively elastic
price expectations, less flexible prices are necessarily better than more
flexible prices. Keynes argued, indeed in the lines quoted by DeLong
and Summers, that "it would be much better that wages should be
rigidly fixed and deemed incapable of material changes, than that
depression should be accompanied by a gradual downward tendency
ofmoney-wages." Complete rigidity would be better, but a more grad-
ual fall-greater rigidity-may well generate more in the way of ex-
pectations offurther declines than the quicker and more rapid decline
that might be associated with less rigidity.
DeLong and Summers's discussion of this issue seems at times to
be caught in the misunderstandings among Keynes, neoclassicists, and
new macroeconomists. To the neoclassicists and the new macroecon-
omists, it is presumably the real wage that matters. Excess supply of
labor-orunemployment-would be eliminated ifworkers would allow
their wages to fall. This would increase employers' demand for labor
1. A "positive monetary effect," to offset this and generate a net increase in the
demand for commodities, would require action by the monetary authority to ensure that
the supply of real cash balances increased more than the demand for them.721 Cyclical Variability of Economic Activity in the United States
and decrease workers' supply of labor and hence restore equilibrium
in the labor market.
To Keynes, however, this was nonsense. He insisted that workers
had no means oflowering the real wage. Iftht~y agreedtolowernominal
wages, since prices under conditions of perft~ctcompetition equal mar-
ginal costs and marginal costs depend overwhelmingly, if not exclu-
sively, onvariable laborcosts, the reduction in wages couldbe expected
to bring about an equal reduction in prices. lIenee, for Keynes, flexible
wages entailed equally flexible prices and a real balance effect that
would lower nominal and (if the elasticity ofexpectations were unity)
real interest rates. The neoclassical Pigou/Haberler argument could
readily be appended to this so that increasing real money balances
would raise aggregate demand via a direct vvealth effect as well as by
lowering the rate ofinterest.
But if this is the argument that DeLong and Summers think to test,
they could not expect much empirical evidence, as Pigou and Patinkin
long ago acknowledged. It is hardly plausible that a fall of 1% or 2%
in prices, let alone a mere slowing in the rate of increase of prices,
would have enough of a real balance or wealth effect to make much
difference in consumptionorin the amountofrecessionfall in aggregate
demand. As Patinkin (1951) pointed out, ev(~n the major fall in prices
in the Great Depression of the thirties could not have made much
difference.
But the suggestions DeLong and Summers make about the role of
lesser price flexibility, developed more rigorously, point further to a
serious contradiction ofanother of their major arguments: that higher
government expenditures and automatic stabilizers have probably con-
tributed to lesser cyclical amplitude but that discretionary counter-
cyclical policy has not. I should make clear that I am not disposed to
argue very enthusiastically that discretionary policy has made much
difference. My own view is that discretionary fiscal policy had been
so rarely and fitfully-if ever-applied that nothing of a stabilizing
nature is likely to show up in the data on its account. Monetary policy
has been, understandably, generally so much more accommodative
than countercyclical that, given the intrinsic limitations of the powers
ofthe monetary authority, I do not look for rnuch in the way ofresults
of discretionary policy there.
That said, though, I find seriously suspect the authors' argument that
the lesser magnitude of cyclical fluctuations may be attributed to au-
tomatic stabilizers but that allegedly greater persistence offluctuations
is evidence that discretionary countercyclical policies have not been
effective.
To begin with, I have serious trouble with a number ofDeLong and
Summers'smeasures. It is notclearto me thatthe magnitude ofcyclical
fluctuations can be well grasped by the standard deviation of either722 J. Bradford DeLong/Lawrence H. Summers
quarter-to-quarter changes in the log of real GNP or the difference
between the log ofreal GNP and the log of "natural" or "trend" real
GNP. I would measure the amplitude of cyclical fluctuations in terms
ofmovements from trough to peak and peak to trough or, adjusting for
trend, as the movement in the differences from trend as the economy
progresses from trough to peak and peak to trough. The DeLong and
Summers measures will tell us more about how abruptly movements
are made or how long the economy is markedly above or below its
trend or "natural" positions than about the total amplitude offluctua-
tions. The corollary of this is that something that slows a decline, or
curbs a boom and hence stretches it out, will be viewed by DeLong
and Summers as reducing "cyclical variability" but increasing
persistence.
Yet there is no reason to assume that what discretionary counter-
cyclical actions may have been implemented functioned to hasten turn-
ing points rather than merely to reduce rates ofchange. And classical
views of the business cycle suggest that a slower decline might well
delay a turning point by slowing the "cleansing" via working off of
excess stocks ofinventoryandfixed capital. Similarly, the very purpose
of slowing a boom (not a Keynesian recommendation) would be to
prolong it.
The authors' argument about greater price rigidity suggests that de-
clines would have been slowed (and upturns as well) by reduction of
the destabilizing expectations factor that would otherwise tend to raise
real interest rates in a recession and lower them in a boom. But then
this factor also would tend to increase the persistence offluctuations.
We appearto be left with no grounds at all for the argument that greater
(or at least no lesser) persistence ofrecessions and booms in the post-
war period must imply a failure ofdiscretionary countercyclical policy
(whatever it may have been).
But that leads to anotherproblem with DeLong and Summers's mea-
sures. They all are apparently addressed to the cycle as a whole, with
no distinction between recessions and booms. In the prewar days, it
was customary to think of Western economies as victims of chronic
unemployment, recessions or depressions driving unemployment well
below its chronic levels, and "sick recoveries which die in their in-
fancy," in the words of Alvin Hansen (1944, 370) and which rarely if
everbrought us even briefly to periods offull capacity, full employment
boom. As J. R. Hicks (1950, chap. 6) put it neatly, the economy could
well struggle along a floor, with recovery never reaching the full em-
ployment ceiling, as I illustrate in figure C12.1. If it did, it would be
aborted abruptly by a shortageofaccelerated-induced investmentwhen
growth became limited by the slope ofthe ceiling at full capacity. But
this view ofthe cycle, which I find appealing, suggests a ratherdifferenty
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Full employment ceiling
.. Upper equilibrium path
Lower equilibrium or "floor"
j~utonomous demand
Time
Fig. CU.! Hicksian trade cycle: low autonomous (or government)
demand.
interpretationofthe dataonwhich DeLongand Summershavefocused.
In the Hicksian treatment, the increase in the proportion ofgross na-
tional product purchased by government as well as the increased cush-
ion ofexogenous consumption provided by government guarantees of
income, current and (via social insurance) future, results in a higher
floor, a higher equilibrium path, and, most important, much longer
periods during which the economy can remain at or close to its ceiling,
as shown in figure CI2.2. The higher floor would mean that the am-
plitude offluctuations is reduced, since the t:~conomycan fluctuate only
between its floor and its ceiling. But the longer periods at the ceiling-
witness the relatively full employment for five years from 1965 through
1969, for example-would turn up as greater "persistence" in the
DeLong and Summers measures. Such persistence would not neces-
sarily imply thatrecessions have beenlongerthanin the prewarperiod.2
The explanation of alleged greater stability DeLong and Summers
offer turns to lessened "liquidity constraints" on consumers in the
postwarperiod. These are presumed to supplement the countercyclical
tax and transfer payments that tend to divorce personal income from
2. Keynes, it may be recalled, was highly critical-very correctly, I would insist--of
policies to stabilize the economy by lopping off the booms. He wanted, rather, to fill in
the troughs. The Kennedy/Johnson tax cut may be viewed as a discretionary policy
designed to dojust that, and the Vietnam War, whatever its intent, served economically
to prolong a boom.724
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Fig. C12.2 Hicksian trade cycle: high autonomous (or government)
demand.
gross national product. As DeLong and Summers point out, if there
were no constraints that tied current consumption to current income,
consumers optimizing in terms of a life cycle or permanent income
consumption function would not even need countercyclical taxes and
transfer payments to maintain consumption relatively constant despite
loss ofjobs and income.
HereDeLongand Summers seemtoget some oftheirnumbers wrong
and ignore others that are relevant. For one thing, the evidence of
greater postwar stability is somewhat marred by the actual facts ofthe
1973-75 and 1981-82 recessions. First, the maximum decline in real
GNP, which did occur during the 1973-75 recession, was not 1.8%, as
DeLongand Summers reportin section 12.1, but4.88% (from $1,266.06
billion in the fourth quarter of 1973 to $1,204.258 billion in the first
quarter of 1975). And the most recent decline was not the 1.8% that
they report in section 12.2.1 but 2.96% (from $1,522.105 billion in the
third quarter of 1981 to $1,477.061 billion in the third quarter of 1982).3
What is more, real disposable income did not rise by the 1.1% and
1.0% that they report (sect. 12.2.1) but fell, by 3.24% in the earlier
period (from $874.1 billion in 1973:4 to $845.8 billion in 1975:1) and by
0.50% in the most recent recession (from $1,058.091 billion in 1981:3
to $1,052.847 billion in 1982:1).4
3. See table 1.2 ofthe national income and product accounts, as revised in July 1984.
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But none of us should take these disposable income figures that
seriously without careful adjustment. It should be well known that
disposable personal income includes nominal interest payments, which
have ofcourse recently become enormous, now surpassing $400 billion,
rather than real interest payments. Another way ofputting this is that
in periods of inflation, holders of debt suffer losses in real value that
should be netted against their interest receipts in calculating their in-
come. With such inflation adjustments, real disposable income may be
seen to have nose-dived considerably more than GNP in the sharp
supply side, inflation shock recession of 1973-75 as well as during the
onslaught ofthe 1981-82 recession. Although higher marginal rates of
taxes and transfer payments probably did contribute to the sharply
lowerregressioncoefficientofchanges in disposable incomeonchanges
in GNP in the postwar period noted in Del-Jong and Summers's table
12.5, I would not infer much from that without viewing movements of
an appropriately adjusted disposable income in particular cycles.
I also find their associated argument about the changes in liquidity
constraints suspect. In particular, in a nUITlber of places they equate
the easing ofliquidity constraints with greater amounts and hence, to
them, greaterease ofconsumerborrowing. Infact, ofcourse, consumer
debt has increased greatly and is now vastly more than in the prewar
period. But what is relevant in its impact on the smoothing of con-
sumption is not the amount of consumer borrowing per se, but net
movements in consumer debt during cycles.
My cursory examination ofthe data confirms my a priori notion that
net changes in consumer debt varied procyclically. For example, net
increases in total consumer credit (Econonzic Report, 1984, table B-
69, p. 301) moved down from $25.6 billion in 1973 to $9.7 billion in
1974 and $9.1 billion in 1975, and then up again to $25.2 billion in 1976
and $39.7 billion in 1977. $48.2 billion in 1978, and $44.6 billion in 1979.
But then they declined to $4.2 billion in 1980 and rose to $24.0 billion
in 1981, only to fall again to $18.2 billion in 1982. These changes were
in nominal dollars. There must certainly have been substantial declines
in the real value ofconsumercredit outstanding during recession years.
Perhaps of even more moment were sharp declines in rates of in-
crease in mortgage debt outstanding during recession years. For aside
from the relation of this to residential inve:stment, it seems apparent
that substantial amounts of mortgage debt were used to finance con-
sumption expenditures. We may note, for example, that mortgage debt
outstanding on one- to four-family houses increased by $96 billion in
1980, by $78 billion in 1981, and by $49 billion in 1982 (Economic
Report, table B-71, p. 303). Since these figures are derived from mort-
gage debt outstanding in nominal dollars, the results of conversion to726 J. Bradford DeLong/Lawrence H. Summers
changes in real debt suggest that these forms of liquidity contributed
to magnifying ratherthan reducing downward pressures onconsumption.
I find various of DeLong and Summers's analyses and tests imag-
inative and ingenious but less than fully convincing. On the whole
question oflessercompetitiveness in the postwareconomy, it is difficult
to get any clearmeasure, particularly as it may relate to price flexibility,
and DeLong and Summers offer little more than intuitive judgments.
One oftheir points, that union membership increased among nonfarm
workers from 9% in 1930 to 29% in 1950, is hardly persuasive in view
ofthe substantial subsequent decline in union membership since.
Relying on future stock market movements as measures of antici-
pated persistence of declines or rises in economic activity strikes me
as particularly frail. I doubt that DeLong and Summers would risk
much money investingonthe basis ofsucha presumedrelation. Indeed,
one may wonder that they did not consider real interest rate move-
ments, on which they had focused in their theoretical discussion. I
should think that in at least some instances economic declines have
been associated with increases in real interest rates and booms have
correlated with declines, and these might well have contributed to
greater "persistence" in economic movements as well as movements
of stock prices.
And I must confess I am left somewhat cold by the variety ofVARs
DeLong and Summers (and many ofour colleagues) display. I am not
sure they know quite what to do with their results; they accept some
ofthe equations reported (acknowledged to be only some ofthe many
equations run) while they reject others ,with statements such as, "this
methodology is not suited to the interwar period . . . so strongly dom-
inated by the Great Depression that all correlations are warped" (sect.
12.4.2). "The Great Depression," we are told, "was a unique event."
But how many other unique events might have accounted for the var-
ious coefficients and their movements, with relevant differences in
coefficients rarely very statistically significant?
My own view of the story on cyclical fluctuations is fairly simple.
There has been a change that relates essentially to a much larger role
ofgovernment, perhaps facilitated by rationalizations stemming from
the Keynesian revolution. The huge surge in aggregate demand stem-
ming from government expenditures in World War II propelled the
economies ofthe United States and much ofthe industrial world close
to full utilization ofcapacity. Shortages ofcapital as a consequence of
the war stimulated an investment boom. The increase in public debt,
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and, directly or indirectly, liquidity. These brought on higher levels of
consumption demand and, possibly also, a greater independence of
consumption from current income. Consumption demand was in-
creased further by the great growth in social insurance that raised
individual perceptions of permanent incom,e and reduced some of the
risk and uncertainty with which it was anticipated.
Increased government expenditures and l~onsumptiondid not, how-
ever, reduce investment demand. Even narrowly defined bu'siness non-
residential investment in plant and equipment was far above its depres-
sion levels, while more broadly definl~d investment, including
government and household expenditures for tangible capital as well as
investment in intangible capital, boomed.
As a consequence of the secular upward movement in aggregate
demand-the inverse of the secular stagnation ofthe prewar period-
employment and output, aided by the particular stimuli ofthe Korean
and Vietnam wars and generally high military spending (certainly high
compared with prewar periods), were generally much closer to full
employment and full capacity. With "autonomous" demand from gov-
ernment and government support programs generally higher and with
substantial anticipations ofcontinued long-term growth and prosperity,
recessions were generally shallower; in sonle cases it was hard to find
more than temporary retardations in the rate ofgrowth, or recessions
that did not show up in annual data. And booms were flatter and longer
as persistent, high, government-generated demand, at least where it
became excess, tended to generate inflation rather than quickly un-
stable peaks ofoutput. Employment did not really become "overfull"
or rise above its "natural" rate. In a relatively free economy and
society, workers are not "tricked" into working more than they want,
anybody's parables to the contrary notwithstanding.
Hence, the postwar period does evidence generally lesser amplitude
offluctuations and, perhaps, greater persist1ence stemming from longer
periods ofrelative prosperity. Some jarring exceptions must be noted,
though: the severe 1973-75 dip stemmingfrom the interactionofsupply
shocks and the resultant inadvertent (and apparently notgreatly under-
stood) contribution ofinflation to effectively tight fiscal and monetary
policy, and the also severe 1981-82 recession, again the result of the
impact of inflation in creating largely unr(~cognized fiscal as well as
monetary tightness.5
When you shake down the facts DeLong and Summers present and
discount some of their imaginative but uncertain inferences, you may
find their story not that inconsistent with nline.
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Comment Herschel I. Grossman
In the forty years since World War II, fluctuations in aggregate eco-
nomic activity on average have been strikingly smaller than during the
precedingfifty years. DeLongand Summers calculate various measures
of this change, critically evaluate a variety of previously suggested
explanations, and propose the unconventional hypothesis that nominal
wage stickiness mitigates aggregate real fluctuations.
The only standard explanation to which DeLong and Summers
give credence is the effect of fiscal arrangements----especially in-
creases in both income tax rates and income maintenance expendi-
tures-in reducing the aggregate marginal propensity to consume out
of income and the demand multiplier. DeLong and Summers usefully
stress that this effect results from the importance of liquidity-
constrained consumers in determining the aggregate marginal pro-
pensity to consume and that the reduction in the multiplier probably
has involved both a reduction in the aggregate response ofdisposable
income to income and a reduction in the proportion of liquidity-
constrained consumers.
DeLong and Summers reject, with good reason, explanations for the
decreased magnitude of fluctuations based on changes in the compo-
sition ofeconomic activity and on the absence offinancial panics. They
also reject the explanation that "discretionary stabilization policies"
have been more efficacious, but here their argument seems largely
semantic. They implicitly define discretionary stabilization policies as
attempts to reduce the persistence ofdisturbances to aggregate activity,
and they observe, interestingly, that persistence actually has not de-
creased in the post-World War II period. This observation, however,
has no apparent relevance for determining whether aspects of policy
other than the fiscal arrangements mentioned above have contributed
to the reduced magnitude ofaggregate fluctuations. The analysis they
present leaves this general question largely unanswered.
Inthis regard, one ofthe weakerarguments in the paperis theattempt
to dismiss the importance of decreased volatility of monetary aggre-
gates in the post-World War II period. The distinctions DeLong and
Summers stress between exogenous and endogenous changes in mon-
etary aggregates and between monetary policy as a cause and an effect
offluctuations in real aggregates are bothfalse andirrelevant. Monetary
policy, like all purposeful human action, depends on prior events, but
atthe same time boththeform ofthis dependence andthe policy actions
themselves can influence other events-past, present, and future. The
relevant question is whether in the post-World War II period the re-
Herschel I. Grossman is professor of economics at Brown University.729 Cyclical Variability of Economic Activity in the United States
lation of monetary policy to the factors that influence it has changed
in such a way as to produce both a reduction in fluctuations in monetary
aggregates and a consequent reduction in the magnitude offluctuations
in real aggregates.
Much existing theoretical and empirical analysis suggests a positive
answer to this question. DeLong and Sumlners do not pose this ques-
tion directly or address the standard argunlents. Their suggestion that
the demonstrated unimportance of financial panics implies the unim-
portance of monetary policy hardly deals ,¥ith the critical issue ofthe
importance of the process generating monetary policy and does not
even follow from their own analysis, which suggests that the unim-
portance offinancial panics resulted from arrangements that stabilized
monetary aggregates.
The most unusual idea DeLong and Summers present is that the
magnitude ofaggregate real fluctuations is inversely related to the de-
gree ofwage flexibility. To derive this hypothesis, theybegin bypointing
out that in the textbook IS-LM model aggregate output depends pos-
itively on both real money balances and inflationary expectations. Thus,
assuming that the price level is positively related to the nominal wage
level, a smaller decline in the nominal \\I'age level in response to a
negative demand disturbance would mean a smaller real money bal-
ance, which by itselfwould cause a-larger decline in aggregate output.
The net change in aggregate output, howt~ver, would also depend on
the effect ofa smaller decline in the nominal wage level on inflationary
expectations.
DeLong and Summers append to this model a wage setting mecha-
nism according to which a decrease in the fraction of workers whose
nominal wages are adjusted each period-a presumed consequence of
the apparent lengthening since World War II of the average duration
ofwage agreements----causes both the current nominal wage level and
rationally expected future inflation to decrease less in response to a
negative demand disturbance. DeLong and Summers argue that, for
certain parametervalues, the effect ofthe smaller decrease in expected
inflation would more than offset the effect of the smaller increase in
real money balances and yield a smaller decline in aggregate output.
Although their illustrative parameter values are plausible for small
changes, they probably would not remain constant as money balances
became large. The combination ofPigou and Keynes effects associated
with real balances should dominate in the limit.
DeLong and Summers point out that an essential characteristic of
their wage mechanism is that it is backward looking. One implication
of this mechanism is that workers are universally concerned not with
their wages relative to the prices or other wages that will materialize
over the term oftheir wage agreements, but with their wages over this730 J. Bradford DeLong/Lawrence H. Summers
term relative to the history of other wages at the time of their wage
negotiation. DeLong and Summers do not attempt to rationalize this
aspect of their model.
Theirsetup, moreover, involves the even strongerassumption, which
is critical but which they do not recognize explicitly, that current nom-
inal wage changes depend as much on wages that were set in the distant
past as on wages set in the recent past. This assumption implies that
the importance of recent nominal wage changes for current nominal
wage changes is negatively related to the average length ofwage agree-
ments. This effect creates the positive relation between the fraction of
workers who negotiate lower nominal wages now and the expected
future change in the nominal wage level.
DeLong and Summers judiciously regard the implications of this
analysis as merely suggestive. Perhaps not surprisingly, they report no
success in fitting the data to a structural representation oftheir model.
As an alternative, they try to interpret the results of a vector auto-
regression involving aggregate output, the price level, and a nominal
interestrate as supporting theirhypothesis. The main empiricalfindings
to which they appeal are positive effects ofprice level innovations and
lags of the price level on current aggregate output. Contrary to their
interpretation, however, we can take these results, together with the
positive relation between current output and past output, merely to be
indicative of the importance and persistent effects of demand
disturbances.
The position DeLong and Summers take regarding the data suggests
the following analogous argument: The amountofdamage from a storm
is positively correlated with the amount ofswaying ofbuildings during
a storm; therefore we could reduce storm damage by making buildings
more rigid.
Although DeLong and Summers focus on the decreased post-World
War II magnitude offluctuations in aggregate economic activity, other
notable characteristics ofmacroeconomic fluctuations also have changed
since World War II. As DeLong and Summers also point out, fluc-
tuations seem to have become more persistent. Another difference
that possibly reflects a fundamental change in the economic structure
involves the cyclical pattern of aggregate activity and inflation. For
example, before World War II, inflation and unemployment almost
always moved in opposite directions. Moreover, for a given inflation
rate, unemployment tended to be higher when unemployment was
decreasing than when it was increasing. In contrast, since World War
II, this tendency has been dramatically reversed. In addition, inflation
and unemployment have moved in the same direction for extended
periods. The question naturally arises ofthe relations among all these
changes. The characteristics of convincing explanations for what we731 Cyclical Variability of Economic Activity in the United States
observe may become clearer ifwe try to keep the entire factual picture
in mind.
Discussion Summary
Martin N. Baily commented on the relation between his own work
and the DeLong/Summers paper. In 1978 he had argued that stabi-
lization policy not only had a direct effect on the economy, but also
induced a reinforcing response from the private sector, making con-
sumption and investment less volatile in response to cyclical output
movements. Contrary to a statement by DeLong and Summers, he
had stressed the importance not only ofdiscretionary policy, but also
of the automatic stabilizers and the comnlitment by the Federal Re-
serve to avoid wild swings in the money supply. In the same paper
he had also pointed out the destabilizing effect of price flexibility
through its impact on real interest rates-·a major feature of the cur-
rent DeLong and Summers paper. Baily also argued that the existence
of high serial correlation in output data is not evidence against the
hypothesis of reinforcing response from the private sector. For ex-
ample, the long sustained recovery after 1961 must have resulted in
very high serial correlation in output data, but this was just the kind
of period that strengthened the belief of the private sector in the
stability of the economy and reduced the volatility of private ex-
penditure decisions.
Robert Barro took exception to the paper's assertion that the mul-
tiplier t.ad fallen. He claimed that the military spending multiplier had
always been less than one and had not changed in the postwar era.
Robert Hall agreed with Barro that the point estimate ofthe multiplier
may have remained constant, but he noted that the standard error of
the multiplier estimate was very large.
Moses Abramovitz observed that the most striking contrast between
the prewar and postwar periods was that there had been no one really
large depression. He hypothesized that thle lingering memories of the
Great Depression were an important factor in changing the character
ofthe business cycle in the postwar period. Phillip Cagan recalled the
1949 NBER conference findings ofRobert A. Gordon, that severe and
moderate cycles differed in character. H(~ maintained that since we
have had no severe cycles since the war-o'wingto the lackofmonetary
panics-the character of the remaining postwar cycles may not differ
from comparable prewar cycles.732 J. Bradford DeLong/Lawrence H. Summers
John Taylor contrasted the role ofprices in the model with his own
paper, in which he avers that inflation control by the government is
responsible for the increased persistence ofoutput fluctuations. He felt
that the omission ofpolicy endogeneity from the analysis lost the main
reason for the deterioration of economic performance.
Robert Gordon noted that the observation of the role of disposable
income in business fluctuations was not new; it had reached the level
oftextbooks some years ago and had been discussed by Hickman and
Coen in 1976 (See the reference in this volume's Introduction). He also
pointed out that whereas the paper had enumerated three channels of
influence ofprice changes on demand, the Keynes, Pigou, and expec-
tations effects, there was one more-theredistributioneffect(discussed
in Fisher's 1933 article on debt and deflation).
Lawrence Summers doubted that the effects ofthe Great Depression
would have lasted the entire postwarperiod. He alsofelt thatcomparing
mild prewar cycles with all postwar cycles was not very meaningful,
since one could always select some prewar cycles that were similar to
postwar cycles.
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